R M Ogorkiewicz
Janes Defence Weekly

One of the consequences of the changes taking place on the military scene is the raising of doubts about the future of tanks. Such doubts are not new as they appeared several times during the past 80 years, only to be dispelled by subsequent events. However, this time the reasons for them are different.

On earlier occasions such doubts generally followed the deployment of new types of anti-tank weapons. Each of these weapons demonstrated that the armor of tanks could be defeated and this was interpreted as putting an end to them. But, contrary to popular belief, tanks were never invulnerable and armor protection has not been their only attribute. In consequence, the successive demonstrations of their vulnerability have not led to their demise.

The vulnerability of tanks is being questioned again, particularly because of the threat of top attack munitions. But the principal reason for the current doubts is whether, in the long term, there will be a need for them. The answer to this lies in the capabilities of tanks and the likely demand for such capabilities in the future.

Amerikansk M1 kampvogn

Future role

Since the end of the Cold War the number of tanks in Europe has gone down dramatically. But elsewhere their numbers have not changed significantly and they continue to be widely used, if only because of the quantities in which they have been produced. For example, of the Soviet-designed T-72 as many as 30,000 have been built and 8,000 exported, according to Russian sources. Eventually numbers will shrink worldwide as the existing tanks come to the end of their working life of 40 years or more, and as new tanks prove too expensive to be produced in large quantities.

Russisk T-72 kampvogn

In the meantime, tanks remain an effective counter to other tanks. But analysts, particularly in the US, envisage that in future regional conflicts enemy tanks as well as other ground targets will be dealt with from a distance by stand-off precision weapons, launched primarily by strike aircraft. In the extreme version of this scenario the long-range precision weapons would be so effective that there would be virtually no close contact battle and, therefore, no need for tanks.

However, some enemy units are bound to evade being targeted at long range by resorting to camouflage, deception and countermeasures as well as infiltration and other tactics, as they have done from Vietnam in the 1960s to Kosovo in the 1990s. They will therefore have to be engaged in close combat. This cannot be done solely with light, portable weapons nor with long-range weapons which, in the nature of things, are not suited to engaging targets at short ranges.

This means that close combat will require the continued use of tanks, which can respond more directly to local situations than long-range weapons and which, at the same time, provide heavier and more mobile firepower than dismounted troops, as well as being less vulnerable to many threats than the latter.